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FLORIDA'S INCOMPETENCY-TO-STAND-TRIAL RULE:
A POSSIBLE LIFE SENTENCE?
I. INTRODUCTION
In Florida, as in most states, an individual charged with a crime
cannot be tried if found by a court to be incompetent to stand trial'
1. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(a) provides:
RULE 3.210. INSANITY
(a) At Time of Trial.
(1) If before or during trial the court, of its own motion, or upon motion of
counsel for the defendant, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is
insane, the court shall immediately fix a time for a hearing to determine the
defendant's mental condition. The defendant shall designate his attorney to serve
as his representative under Fla. Stat. § 394.459(11), F.S.A., in the event the de-
fendant is found mentally incompetent. The court may appoint not exceeding
three disinterested qualified experts to examine the defendant and to testify at the
hearing as to his mental condition. Other evidence regarding the defendant's
mental condition may be introduced at the hearing by either party.
(2) If the court decides that the defendant is sane, it shall proceed to trial.
(3) If the court decides that the defendant is insane, it shall commit him or
her to the Division of Mental Health for hospitalization under the provisions of
Fla. Stat. § 394.467, F.S.A.. The order of commitment shall request that the defend-
ant be examined and a written report be furnished the court, stating (1) whether
there is a substantial probability that the defendant will become mentally com-
petent to stand trial within the foreseeable future and, if so, (2) whether progress
toward that goal is being made. The defendant's attorney, as his representative,
shall not waive any hearing authorized by Fla. Stat. Ch. 394, F.S.A., and shall file a
report with the court within the first six months after hospitalization and each
year thereafter stating what progress, if any, is being made in the treatment of
defendant. Such representative shall be authorized to consent, on behalf of de-
fendant, to necessary surgical or medical treatment and procedures. If at any time
the Division of Mental Health shall consider that the defendant is mentally com-
petent to stand trial, the proper officer of the institution where defendant is
hopsitalized shall promptly notify the court to that effect in writing and place the
defendant in the custody of the sheriff. The court shall thereupon conduct a hear-
ing on the mental competency of the defendant.
(4) If at any time after such commitment the court decides, after hearing, that
the defendant is competent to stand trial, it shall enter its order so finding and
declaring the defendant sane, after which the court shall proceed with the trial.
(5) If at any time after such commitment the court decides, after hearing, (1)
that there is no substantial probability that the defendant will become mentally
competent to stand trial within the foreseeable future, or (2) that no progress is
being made toward that goal, it shall enter an order accordingly and shall find and
adjudge the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity and forthwith direct the
institution of civil proceedings for the commitment of the defendant. The defendant
shall remain in custody until determination of the civil proceedings. (emphasis
added)
(6) For the purposes of any hearing held pursuant to subsection (a)(3) or sub-
section (a)(5), the court may appoint not more than three disinterested experts to
examine the defendant and testify as to his or her mental condition at such hearing.
Other evidence concerning the defendant's mental condition may be introduced at
the hearing by either party.
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Florida employs the common law test of competency: 2 whether the
defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding of the proceedings
against him." The policy underlying the prohibition against trial is
the protection of the incompetent accused.4 If the defendant is unable
to consult rationally with counsel about the charges, a fair trial will
be impossible.
Traditionally, the alternative to trial has been commitment to a
mental institution until competency is regained5 However, commit-
ment often subverts the protective interest in postponing trial; rather
than benefiting the accused, it frequently works to his detriment. Not
only is he barred from assisting in the preparation for trial, but will
actually receive little treatment in most state mental hospitals. Many
institutions are overcrowded and understaffed; patients rarely see med-
ical personnel. Control over the care and treatment of patients is
exercised by ward attendants who are generally nonmedical personnel
with little training. Brutality, malnutrition, unsanitary conditions, and
lack of health care are characteristics of many state institutions, includ-
ing Florida's.6 Consequently, commitment frequently results in a
worsening of the defendant's condition. In addition to this failure to
fulfill the enunciated purpose of protecting the incompetent defendant,
commitment serves the rarely stated and certainly illegitimate function
(7) If the defendant is declared insane during the trial and afterwards declared
sane, his other uncompleted trial shall not constitute former jeopardy.
It is a common law precept that an incompetent may not be forced to stand trial. Youtsey
v. United States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899). This concept, based on equitable considerations,
has been held by the United States Supreme Court to be a requirement of constitutional
due process. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). Whenever the question of a defend-
ant's competency is raised, before, during, or after a trial, a competency hearing must be
held. A defendant cannot waive his right to have the issue heard. Thus the question can
be raised for the first time on appeal. Pate, supra; see also Perkins v. Mayo, 92 So. 2d 641
(Fla. 1957); Cioli v. State, 303 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
2. Deeb v. State, 158 So. 880, 881 (Fla. 1935). See Comment, Florida's Incompetency
to Stand Trial Rule: Justice in a Straightjacket, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 248, 250 (1974).
3. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
4. "[T]he purpose of Section 917.01 [now FtA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210 (a)] ... is to protect
the accused-to make sure that he will be able to assist his counsel in preparing the best
defense possible to the crime with which he is charged." Daniels v. O'Connor, 243 So. 2d
144, 147 (Fla. 1971). See also Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV. 454,
455 (1967).
5. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1706a (Supp. 1971) (since amended); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 1370-1372 (1970) (since amended); FLA. R. CumA. P 3.210(a).
6. See Note, The Rights of the Mentally Ill During Incarceration: The Developing
Law, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 494, 495 (1973). See also Donaldson v. O'Conner, 493 F.2d 507,
511-13 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Wyatt v. Aderholt,
503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). These cases describe the conditions existing in state
mental hospitals in Florida and Alabama, respectively.
INCOMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
of removing from society those who are accused of crimes but cannot
be tried.7
This comment will examine Florida's incompetency to stand trial
rule in light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions which
have set standards under which states may commit their citizens to
mental institutions. It is contended that the Florida rule, though
drafted to comply with the Supreme Court's mandate, is still unable
to survive constitutional attack.
II. THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS
Florida's present incompetency-to-stand-trial rule was revised in
19738 to comport with the United States Supreme Court decision in
Jackson v. Indiana.9 In Jackson, the Court was concerned with the
constitutionality of an Indiana statute10 similar to the original Florida
incompetency rule. The defendant was a 27-year-old illiterate deaf-
mute" charged with the robbery of a purse and cash worth a total of
9 dollars.' 2 The trial court found him incompetent," and he was
committed to the Indiana Department of Mental Health until the
department could certify that he had regained his competency. It
seemed unlikely, however, that Jackson would ever become com-
7. This question is discussed thoroughly in Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commit-
ment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 832 (1960); Note, supra note 4, at
466-68. Consider the case of United States v. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Cal. 1959),
discussed in Note, supra note 4, at 466-68. There, four defendants were indicted for a
murder committed 10 years earlier. A motion was entered on their behalf to dismiss the
indictment on the ground that it violated their sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.
The indictment was dismissed against three of the defendants. The fourth, however, was
found to be mentally incompetent; he was ordered committed until he regained his
competency. The court admitted that its action was motivated by a desire to protect
society as well as the defendant. Id. at 65. It is difficult, however, to see how the defendant
benefited at all from the court's action.
8. The former rule was adopted in 1967, prior to which the procedure with respect
to incompetent defendants was embodied in FLA. STAT. § 917.01 (1967). The rule
essentially restated § 917.01, exceyt it omitted a provision requiring the committing
court's consent before the incompetent defendant could be released from the hospital.
The 1968 committee note following FLA. R. CIM. P. 3.210 states, somewhat ambiguously,
that this provision is retained by statute. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the requirement that the committing court consent to release of
accused incompetents in Daniels v. O'Connor, 243 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1971). Since 1973,
the court's jurisdiction has been maintained through the combined provisions of FLA.
R. CaIM. P. 3.210(a)(5) and 3.460. See notes 37, 38 infra.
9. 406 U.S. 715 (1973).
10. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1706a (Supp. 1971) (since amended).
11. 406 U.S. at 717.
12. Jackson v. State, 255 N.E.2d 515, 518 (Ind. 1970).
13. 406 U.S. at 717.
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petent.1 4 The Supreme Court noted that if charges had not been
pending against him, Jackson probably would not have qualified for
commitment under civil commitment criteria, which were that he be
dangerous to himself or others or unable to care for himself.'5
The state contended that Jackson's commitment was temporary
since it could last only as long as he remained incompetent. The
Supreme Court soundly rejected this argument: since Jackson would
probably never improve, his "temporary" commitment amounted to
a possible life sentence which was totally unwarranted under the
civil commitment criteria. Subjecting Jackson to more lenient commit-
ment standards combined with more stringent release standards than
those applied to noncriminal patients, concluded the Court, deprived
him of equal protection of the laws.'
The Indiana statute was also found deficient under the due process
clause. 1 7 The Court held that due process requires the nature and
duration of commitment to be reasonably related to its purpose. 8 If
its purpose is the restoration of competency and if this purpose is not
14. Two psychiatrists appointed to examine Jackson testified that he was unable to
understand the charges against him or to participate effectively in his own defense,
would never learn to read or write, and would probably never be able to communicate
proficiently in sign language. 406 U.S. at 718-19.
15. 406 U.S. at 727-29. These are the criteria for involuntary commitment embodied
in IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 16-14-9.1-1 to 16-14-9.1-18 (Supp. 1975).
16. Id. at 730. The Court referred to its earlier decision in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107 (1966), in which it held that fewer procedural and substantive safeguards against
indefinite commitment could not be justified by the fact of criminal conviction and
sentence. Therefore "the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice." 406 U.S. at
724.
17. Id. at 731. The Court noted that since its decision in Greenwood v. United States,
350 U.S. 366 (1956), federal courts, in considering the question of releasing a defendant
with dim prospects for improvement, have consistently applied the so-called "rule of
reasonableness" to the federal incompetency statute. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-46 (1970). Under
this statute, a defendant found unable to stand trial may be committed until he "shall
be mentally competent to stand trial or until the pending charges against him are dis-
posed of according to law." 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (1970). In Greenwood, however, the Court
tempered the statute by holding that an incompetent defendant who would probably
never regain the capacity to stand trial must be released unless there was a showing of
dangerousness. 350 U.S. at 368-69. The Court based this result on 18 U.S.C. § 4248, which
requires that a federal prisoner cannot be committed at the end of his prison term to a
mental institution without a showing of both mental incompetency and dangerousness.
Since Greenwood, federal courts have held that § 4246 cannot be read except in con-
junction with the qualification imposed by § 4248. United States v. Klein, 325 F.2d 283
(2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Walker, 335 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. Cal. 1971); United States
v. Jackson, 306 F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
Cook v. Ciccone, 312 F. Supp. 822 (W.D. Mo. 1970) is typical of the federal courts'
view. There the court noted the "inherent unfairness and substantial injustice in keeping
an unconvicted person in federal custody to await trial where it is plainly evident his
mental condition will not permit trial within a reasonable period of time." Id. at 824.
18. 406 U.S. at 738.
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being served, there is no excuse for further commitment. Thus, the
Jackson Court held that a defendant, committed solely on account of
his incompetency to stand trial, cannot be held longer than reasonably
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability he
will attain competency within the foreseeable future. If it is deter-
mined that he will not, the state must either institute civil commit-
ment proceedings or release the defendant.'
Three years after Jackson, in O'Connor v. Donaldson,20 the Su-
preme Court established minimal civil commitment standards. The
plaintiff, Kenneth Donaldson, had been committed to the Florida State
Hospital in Chattahoochee in January 1957.21 During a 15-year con-
finement, Donaldson repeatedly requested release. Evidence showed
that he was not dangerous to himself or others, and that he would
have received care from responsible persons outside the institution if
released. 22 In 1971, Donaldson brought a civil rights action alleging
that Dr. J. B. O'Connor, superintendent of the hospital, and other
staff members, had "intentionally and maliciously deprived him of his
constitutional right to liberty."23 The district court upheld Donaldson's
claim, and he was awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.2 1 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court agreed that Donaldson had been deprived of
his constitutional right to liberty.25 The Court found no justification
for committing a person who was not dangerous and who could live
safely outside the institution.2 6 The Court also reiterated the Jackson
19. Id. Jackson did not establish time limits for commitment, but the court did note
that in a case such as Jackson's, 3% years exceeded a "reasonable period" of commitment.
Id.
20. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
21. Id. at 564.
22. Id. at 567-68.
23. Id. at 565.
24. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1974). Donaldson's suit was
originally filed as a class action on behalf of himself and his fellow patients. He asked
for damages and habeas corpus ordering the release of himself and all members of his
class. Donaldson was released, but the court dismissed the suit as a class action. In an
amended complaint, Donaldson again asked for damages and for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief which would require the hospital to provide adequate psychiatric treatment.
This request was later dropped. Id. at 512-13.
25. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). The Court remanded the case
to the Fifth Circuit on the question of damages, ordering the court to consider whether
the trial court's instructions on O'Connor's liability were adequate. The lower court
judge had failed to instruct the jury on the effect of O'Connor's claimed reliance on state
law as authorization for Donaldson's continued confinement. Id. at 577.
26. Id. at 575. In the words of the Court: "T]he mere presence of mental illness does
not disqualify a person from preferring his home . . . . Moreover, while the State may
arguably confine a person to save him from harm, incarceration is rarely if ever a
1976]
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requirement: not only must the state's original commitment be based
upon constitutionally adequate grounds, but it cannot continue after
those grounds no longer exist. 27
Through its decisions in Jackson and Donaldson, the Supreme
Court established the conditions under which a state may confine a
person incompetent to stand trial. It may initially confine an incom-
petent accused only long enough to determine whether he will attain
the capacity to stand trial within the foreseeable future. 28 If it is
determined the defendant is permanently incompetent, the state must
either civilly commit or release himY To civilly commit the defendant,
the state must show that he is either dangerous or unable to care for
himself adequately.3 0 In short, the state is specifically precluded from
determining that an accused is dangerous solely on the basis of the
pending criminal charge.31
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE FLORIDA RULE
As previously noted, Florida's rule for the commitment of incom-
petents was revised in 1973 to comply with the Jackson decision; spe-
cifically, sections (a)(3) and (a)(5) 32 were added to the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure 3.210.3 Unfortunately, the language of the rule
is confusing and inconsistent. First, adequate standards for declaring
a person incompetent are not clearly established. The word "in-
sanity," used to describe incompetency to stand trial, is also used to
describe the legal defense to a criminal act.34 The blurring of this
necessary condition for raising the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in
freedom, on their own or with the help of family or friends." Id.
27. Id. at 574-75. The Fifth Circuit had also asserted that the fourteenth amendment
guarantees an involuntarily, civilly committed mental patient the right to treatment. 493
F.2d at 510. The court based its decision on a quid pro quo theory: if the state is allowed
to involuntarily confine a person because of his mental illness, it is then required to
provide the patient with treatment which will assist him in improving his condition. Id.
at 522. The Supreme Court, however, held that the right-to-treatment issue was not
presented by this case. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975). For a compre-
hensive discussion of the right-to-treatment issue see Saphire, The Civilly-Committed
Public Mental Patient and the Right to Aftercare, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 232 (1976).
28. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
29. Id.
30. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
31. 406 U.S. at 728.
32. The text of these sections is set forth at note I supra.
33. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
34. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.210(a) concerns incompetency to stand trial; FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.210(b) concerns insanity as a defense. Both sections of the rule use the term "insanity."
But the term has a very different meaning for purposes of each section. Indeed, one may
well have possessed his mental faculties at the time he allegedly committed an offense,
but nevertheless be incompetent to stand trial; i.e., "insane" for purposes of postponing
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distinction has resulted in confusion and misapplication of the stand-
ards by both judges and psychiatrists.
In addition, the rule fails to define adequately the procedures to be
followed once a finding of incompetency is made. Under Jackson, the
initial commitment is constitutional only if its purpose is to determine
whether a defendant will ever regain competency. In Florida, however,
if the defendant is found incompetent, the rule requires that the court
commit him to the Division of Mental Health pursuant to the civil
commitment statute.3 5 The rule does not explicitly state whether com-
mitment of an accused who does not meet civil commitment criteria is
authorized, but the hospital is given a mandatory responsibility for the
accused after he is committed to the division.36 Thus the rule appears
to contain a presumption that any defendant found incompetent is
dangerous or unable to care for himself. Such a presumption is ex-
pressly prohibited by Jackson.
Jackson emphatically provides that if it is apparent during a de-
fendant's hospitalization that he is permanently incompetent, he must
be released or civilly committed. Florida's rule, drafted to comply with
this decision, requires that he be civilly committed and adjudged "not
guilty by reason of insanity."37 A person so adjudged is automatically
recommitted to the institution under Florida Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 3.460 and may not be released without the committing court's
consent. 8 Thus the incompetent under Florida's procedure is subject
trial. The concept of "insanity" as a defense is defined in Florida by the M'Naghten test
which basically asks whether the defendant "knew right from wrong" when he committed
the act of which he is accused. Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d 873, 877 (Fla. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 801 (1970); Davis v. State, 32 So. 822, 826-27 (Fla. 1902).
The term "mental illness" is now used in Florida's civil commitment provisions, the
term "insanity" having been deleted completely. FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (1975). For an exten-
sive treatment of the subject see Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Il1, 87 HAPV. L.
RaV. 1190 (1974).
35. FLA. R. CRdm. P. 3.210(a)(3).
36. Id. The rule requires "hospitalization," examination, and a written report to the
court on the defendant's condition. No alternative to hospitalization is stated.
37. FLA. R. CraM. P. 3.210(a)(5). The text of the rule is set forth at note 1 supra.
38. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.460 generally applies to those who have been tried by a jury
and have raised insanity at the time of the alleged crime as a defense:
RULE 3.460. ACQUITTAL FOR CAUSE OF INSANITY
When a person tried for an offense shall be acquitted by the jury for the cause
of insanity, the jury, in giving their verdict of not guilty, shall state that it was
given for such cause. If the discharge or going at large of such insane person shall
be considered by the court manifestly dangerous to the peace and safety of the
people, the court shall order him to be committed to jail or otherwise to be cared
for as an insane person and such person shall be held in custody until released by
order of the committing court, or may give him into the care of his friends, on their
giving satisfactory security for the proper care and protection of such person;
1976)
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to indefinite commitment with release conditioned upon the commit-
ting court's discretion. Note that rule 3.210 requires this result and
at the same time requires civil commitment.3 9 Obviously, the rule is
inconsistent if applied to one not civilly commitable, suggesting again
the prohibited presumption that an incompetent defendant is also
dangerous or unable to care for himself.
In contrast to the required indefinite commitment for an incom-
petent accused, an involuntarily civilly committed patient not charged
with a crime is under no such constraint. He may be committed under
Florida's Baker Act40 only if it is shown that he is mentally ill and
dangerous to himself or others, or is in need of treatment and does not
have sufficient capacity to seek it on his own.4 1 Furthermore, such a
patient must be released within 6 months after hospitalization unless
it is determined at a hearing that the civil commitment criteria still
prevail;4 2 even then, further hospitalization is permitted for only
specified periods of time. Additionally, the hospital administrator may
at any time release the patient if it is determined the civil commitment
criteria no longer exist.
4 3
It is clear the commitment scheme authorized by rules 3.210 and
3.460, contrary to the Supreme Court's mandate in Jackson, differs
from the civil commitment procedure under the Baker Act in two
important respects: (1) an incompetent may be indefinitely committed,
and (2) he cannot be released without the committing court's consent.
While no Florida court has considered the Florida commitment scheme
from a constitutional standpoint, the attorney general of Florida has
issued an opinion in which this procedure was approved.4 4 The opin-
ion based its defense of the scheme upon an assumption that the re-
quirements of Jackson are met as long as the commitment of the in-
competent complies with civil commitment standards, "5 even though
release standards are more stringent.
otherwise he shall be discharged.
(Emphasis added).
39. Rule 3.210 does not explicitly require that an incompetent be subjected to the
requirement of rule 3.460 that release be conditioned on the committing court's consent.
It would be difficult to construe the statute otherwise, however, especially in light of the
Attorney General's opinion that 3.460 must apply. See 1975 FLA. Arr'v GEN. Op. 075-228;
notes 44-49 and accompanying text infra.
40. FLA. STAT. ch. 394 (1975), commonly called the Baker Act, is Florida's civil com-
mitment statute.
41. Criteria for civil commitment are set forth in FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (1975).
42. FLA. STAT. § 394.467(2) (1975).
43. FLA. STAT. § 394.469(1) (1975).
44. 1975 FLA. ATr'y GEN. Op. 075-228.
45. It appears, though, that the commitment procedure does not in fact comply with
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The attorney general found a rational basis for more stringent
release standards in the state's need for "safe-keeping" of the defendant
until trial. This argument is fallacious on its face since the defendant,
adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity,46 has no criminal charges
pending. However, the pendency of criminal proceedings is irrelevant
since Jackson specifically held that a "more stringent standard of re-
lease than those generally applicable to all others not charged with
offenses . . ." violates the accused incompetent's right to equal protec-
tion.47 Similarly, this procedure violates due process which requires,
under Jackson, that the nature and duration of commitment be reason-
ably related to its purpose. Obviously, if the purpose of commitment,
the restoration of competency, is impossible or unlikely to be achieved,
further commitment cannot be defended unless these civil commitment
criteria are present.
The attorney general further defends the combined effect of rules
3.210 and 3.460 on the ground that any other interpretation would
lead to "absurd results and conclusions. " 41 The "absurd" result of
Florida's recognition of the constitutional rights of incompetent de-
fendants would create the "anomaly" of the court's retaining a hold by
rule 3.460 over those acquitted by a jury on the ground of insanity
while abdicating its hold on those who have never been tried. The
attorney general's opinion argues that there is a greater justification for
detention of one against whom a charge is still pending than for one
acquitted because of insanity.49 Jackson demands a contrary conclusion.
The court expressly stated that pending criminal charges can provide
no justification for differing treatment.50 It should be noted that the
attorney general's argument presupposes the validity of rule 3.460.
Although the rule was upheld by the Florida Supreme Court in 1974, 51
the weight of decisions in other jurisdictions considering similar
questions indicates the result is a minority one.52
Jackson since the accused can be committed solely on the basis of his incapacity to stand
trial. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
46. The practice of judging a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity when he has
never had the opportunity to present his case to a jury may also be suspect on equal
protection grounds. The defendant's constitutional right to a presumption of innocence
until proven guilty is lost if the court can merely "adjudge" him not guilty by reason of
insanity. The "adjudged" defendant is stigmatized, since the classification carries with it
a presumption that the defendant committed the crime even though he has a valid in-
sanity defense.
47. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 730 (1972).
48. 1975 FLA. Arr'y GEN. Op. 075-228, at 6.
49. Id. at 7.
50. See note 16 supra.
51. Powell v. Genung, 306 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1974).
52. Statutes similar to rule 3.460 have been struck down in other jurisdictions under
1976]
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
A significant alteration of Florida's incompetency to stand trial rule
is sorely needed. At a minimum, revision of the rule should: (1) state
clearly the standard of incompetency which will warrant a postpone-
ment of trial; and (2) state the standards under which incompetent
defendants may be committed with full regard given to their constitu-
tional rights.
The first goal would be achieved by the elimination of the term
"insanity" from the rule and the substitution of a clear definition of
incompetency to stand trial. This definition should be in terms of
"competency" and should make clear that competency has no relation
to the defendant's state of mind at the time of the alleged criminal
conduct.5"
Second, and most important, the constitutional criteria of Jackson
and O'Connor should be met. Compliance with these criteria will
almost certainly require a specific maximum time limit during which
determinations of competency to stand trial must be made. If it is
clearly likely the defendant will never be able to stand trial, or is not
improving, he should be released or civilly committed. If, at the end
of this commitment time he is not yet competent but is improving,
there should be permitted a further specific time period for recovery.
If the defendant does not recover within this time and does not meet
civil commitment standards, he should be released. In Jackson's case,
the Court indicated that 3V2 years was more than enough time to make
this determination;5 4 and a District of Columbia report has shown that
in most cases, 2 years is sufficient time. A defendant "confined as incom-
petent for 2 years is likely to remain so for a substantial additional
period." 55 The rule should certainly state that in no event may the
standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107 (1966), discussed at note 16 supra. In People v. Lally, 224 N.E.2d 87 (N.Y. 1966), the
New York Court of Appeals extended the effect of Baxstrom in New York, applying
Baxstrom's standards to commitment following acquittal by reason of insanity. Accord,
Cameron v. Mullen, 387 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1967), extending the principle to release as
well as commitment standards. These decisions rest on the theory that no valid presump-
tion of present dangerousness can arise solely from past criminal acts. For a thorough
discussion of this subject see Comment, Automatic Commitment of a Defendant Found
Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1203.
53. An amended rule might provide:
A person may not be tried or punished while mentally incompetent. For purposes of
this rule a defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial if he is presently un-
able, as a result of mental disorder, to understand the charge and proceedings
against him and to assist counsel in a rational manner in his defense.
54. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
55. Judicial Conference of the D.C. Circuit, Report of the Committee on Problems
Connected with District of Columbia Mental Examination of the Accused in Criminal
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total time spent in a mental institution exceed the maximum penalty
for the alleged criminal offense.15
Florida should also allow an incompetent defendant to assert,
through his attorney, any legal objections to prosecution which can be
determined before trial and without defendant's participation. Cer-
tainly a defendant should be permitted to challenge the charges on
the grounds that the prosecution is barred by law, or that the indict-
ment or information is defective in form.5 7 Some states, either by
statute or through judicial interpretation, provide for a hearing on the
defense to the charges.5 8
Jackson implies that in order for a state to commit an accused solely
because of his incapacity to be tried, it must guarantee the defendant
will receive treatment towards restoration of competency. 59 After
Jackson and O'Connor, the sole justification for committing an accused,
unless the civil commitment criteria are found to apply, is to aid him
in regaining his ability to be tried. He can no longer be locked up in
the "public interest" unless he is shown to be dangerous on a basis
other than pending criminal charges. The hospital should be required
at stated intervals to report to the court on the defendant's condition;
Cases Before Trial 132, 138-39 (1965), cited in Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81
HARV. L. REV. 454, 472 (1967).
56. A good example of a time-limited scheme for commitment of incompetents is
found in CAL. PEN. CODE § 1370 (Supp. 1976). This provision requires that within 90 days
of commitment, the superintendent of the state hospital to which the defendant is com-
mitted must report to the court on defendant's progress. Thereafter, a report must be
filed every 6 months. If at any time within 18 months after commitment it is determined
that the defendant is not likely to regain competency, he is released. After the defendant
has been in commitment for 18 months, a new hearing is held by the court. Only if the
defendant shows signs of improvement and it is determined that he will probably become
competent within 18 more months will commitment continue. The maximum total time
a defendant may continue in commitment under the incompetency statute is 3 years.A discussion of California's approach to the problem is found in Parker, California's
New Scheme for the Commitment of Individuals Found Incompetent to Stand Trial, 6
PAC. L.J. 484 (1975).
57. See Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108
U. PA. L. REV. 832 (1960). See also Gobert, Competency to Stand Trial: A Pre- and Post-
Jackson Analysis, 40 TENN. L. REV. 659 (1973). Both articles discuss this issue extensively.
See-also Comment, Florida's Incompetency to Stand Trial Rule: Justice in a Straightjacket,
27 U. FLA. L. REV. 248, 253 (1974).
58. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws chs. 123, 137 (Supp. 1975) and CAL. PEN. Cov
§ 1368.1(a) (Supp. 1976). See also Ex parte Kent, 490 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Mo. 1973), discussed
in Comment, Criminal Procedure-Mental Illness and Commitment, 39 Mo. L. REV. 602,
605-06 (1974). The Model Penal Code would allow the defense attorney to assert objections
to prosecution which can be fairly determined "prior to trial and without the personal
participation of the defendant." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06.
59. 406 U.S. at 738. "[E]ven if it is determined that the defendant probably soon will
be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward
that goal."
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if it is evident the defendant is not improving and is receiving no
treatment, he should be released. 0
Incorporating these provisions into Florida's rule would serve sev-
eral important functions. First, it would assure that defendants will
not be institutionalized when they may not in fact be prosecuted, either
because prosecution is barred by law or because the charging instru-
ment is faulty. Second, this scheme would place the initiative for
determining a defendant's recovery on the courts. The incompetency
to stand trial issue is ultimately a legal, as well as a medical one. It
should be a bilateral decision: while medical testimony is essential, the
court knows best what is required of a defendant during a trial and to
what extent the defendant must assist counsel in preparing a defense.
6 1
Under the present rule, after initial commitment the court abdicates
its responsibility in the decision to the hospital staff. Since the initiative
in determining recovery is on the hospital, it is not unlikely that given
the overcrowded state of most mental hospitals, the defendant may
become "lost" in the institution.6 2 The requirement for periodic court
review would insure that the commitment of an accused is serving the
function of preparing a defendant to stand trial. Finally, a maximum
time limit for commitment would insure that the hopelessly incom-
petent individual could not effectively be sentenced to an indefinite
or life commitment simply because he is unable to be tried. These
suggestions appear to be the minimum necessary to insure protection
of the individual's constitutional rights as enunciated by Jackson and
O'Connor.
In addition, several options should be available to the court by
which a defendant may be placed in a situation conducive to recovery.
For example, the court should be empowered to order a defendant
returned to his own environment and treated on an out-patient basis
at a local community facility, if it finds that this would be more bene-
ficial than commitment." Furthermore, the defendant should have the
same opportunity for release pending trial as any other accused.
Florida's present incompetency-to-stand-trial rule reflects society's
inconsistent attitudes toward the mentally ill offender: the desire to
protect the accused is countered by the desire to protect society from a
60. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has enunciated a constitutional right
to treatment for the incompetent defendant committed to a mental institution. Nason v.
Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hosp., 233 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1968).
61. Comment, supra note 57, at 253.
62. See note 6 and accompanying text supra. See also Note, The Rights of the
Mentally Ill During Incarceration: The Developing Law, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 494, 495 (1973).
63. Id. See also Foote, Gobert, supra note 57. FLA. STAT. § 394.463 (1975) contemplates
access to local community facilities.
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person thought to be guilty of a crime. But in Jackson and O'Connor,
the Supreme Court ruled that an individual's constitutional rights are
too important to be subordinated to public opinion. Commitment
under the present rule is no more than an alternative form of convic-
tion. Such a commitment scheme does violence to the constitutional
safeguards designed to preserve the individual's rights; Florida's present
rule must be changed to insure that these basic constitutional guar-
antees are honored.
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